Many Somalis do not regard the KDF troops as liberators, but as invaders
When Kenya sent its troops to Somalia on 16 October, 2011, under Operation Linda Nchi, its biggest goal was to protect its territorial integrity from foreign aggression. The strategy indicated that the Kenya Defence Forces would move into Somalia in pursuit of Al-Shabaab militiamen.
More than four years down the line, Kenya has neither fully secured its territory from the aggression of Al-Shabaab nor reduced the threat it poses. Having liberated Kismayu, one of the strongholds of the terrorists, many questions still linger on the effectiveness of the Kenyan approach to Somalia.
Contrary to what Kenya wanted to achieve, this military mission has made it even more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The risk of Al-Shabaab retaliatory attacks has increased. Granted, there had been other attacks in Nairobi and the coast, but these have escalated since the military intervention.
Many Somalis do not regard the KDF troops as liberators, but as invaders. Al-Shabaab leaders use this in their propaganda campaign to portray Kenya as an occupying force in order to deflect world attention from their own brutality.
At home, Kenya did not handle relations with its ethnic Somali population well. Its targeting of the huge Somali population in Nairobi’s Eastleigh suburb as sympathisers of terrorists, especially in the wake of the attacks, did not help the cause of fighting terrorism. Describing the people whose cooperation is vital to fight the menace as wholesale supporters of terrorists has sent a wrong message to the people.
Somalia has been the subject of foreign intervention before. In 1991, the US government went to Somalia under Operation Restore Hope to help the UN to establish a safe environment for humanitarian assistance to civilians suffering at the hands of warlords who had no qualms about attacking food convoys.
AROUSED RESENTMENT
The operation aroused resentment among the Somali, who did not trust American involvement. In 2006, Ethiopia went to Somalia, ostensibly to save the Transitional National Government from the Islamic Courts Union. Both operations resulted in more lives being lost and did not achieve their objectives. Kenya should learn from these experiences.
If the Kenyan Government wants to achieve its objective in Somalia, it must understand that the military option alone is not a solution. It needs to develop a softer and more comprehensive approach.
Firstly, it is important for Kenya to show a greater interest in Somali’s endeavours in building a state and its security apparatus. Its engagement should, therefore, include diplomatic and development assistance to Somalia. It should strive to be viewed as being friendly to Somalia and its people in these difficult times.
Secondly, the conflict in Somalia has political and social dimensions that Kenya ought to take into consideration. For example, it should ensure that all Somali stakeholders are included in all aspects of its engagement in that country. Currently, the general impression is that the Kenyan strategy focuses mainly on border security operations and the communities around the border.
Finally, Kenya needs to develop a post-military strategy to ensure that both countries are able to resume a positive relationship when the intervention ceases. Kenya will have to design a plan for supporting the federal government of Somalia in taking control of the liberated areas.
It also needs to adopt a broader security cooperation framework with the whole of Somalia. This would create a conducive environment for Kenya and Somalia to coexist peacefully and promote good neighbourliness after the current security challenges are overcome.
Mr Omar is a special representative of the Horn of Africa Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. [email protected].
